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humans deserve. Perhaps we can raise no legitimate complaints against 
God for not loving us. Still, shlove isn’t what many hoped for (especially 
those who have been deeply harmed as a result of seeking God), and to 
our human eyes it may pale in the light of the love we sometimes receive 
from the finite, fallen humans.
pp. 285–288 FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY Vol. 36 No. 2 April 2019
doi: 10.5840/faithphil2019362124
All rights reserved
The Christian Idea of God: A Philosophical Foundation for Faith , by Keith Ward. 
Cambridge University Press, 2017. Pp. 229. $ 32.99 (paperback).
JORDAN WESSLING, Fuller Theological Seminary
The Christian Idea of God is the third installment of Keith Ward’s systematic 
Christian philosophical theology. However, the book is self-contained and 
meant to stand alone as an exposition and defense of “personal idealism,” 
for the purpose of providing a solid philosophical foundation for Chris-
tian belief. In Ward’s usage, “idealism” refers to the perspective that “mat-
ter cannot exist without mind and depends upon mind for its existence” 
(1). And while Ward never unpacks this dependency relation in detail, it is 
clear that the form of idealism that Ward defends allows for the existence 
of material objects, so long as they are sustained by mind in some way, 
in contrast to a thoroughgoing immaterialism of the kind that is often at-
tributed to Bishop Berkeley. Roughly stated, personal idealism is the view 
that there is one personal supreme mind—one that knows, thinks, feels, 
and intends—on which everything else in the world depends. By design, 
the offered cumulative case for philosophical idealism does not rise to the 
level of argumentative rigor typified by journals of analytic philosophy. 
Instead, the aim is to present a broad framework with wide explanatory 
scope and practical import. The result is a highly readable exploration 
of the contours of a comprehensive worldview, which provides a natural 
home for the Christian faith.
The book contains three parts. In the first part of the book, Ward 
contends that conscious experience is the best starting point for human 
knowledge. And when a human scrutinizes her conscious experience, she 
discovers that sense perceptions, thoughts, and feelings are different in 
kind than that which is spatially located and publicly observable, and that 
these mental states are immaterial and possessed by a unitary subject who 
persists across time and performs intentional actions. Here it seems that 
Ward affirms some form of substance dualism regarding humans, where 
the mental and physical are distinct yet tightly integrated, but Ward is not 
as forthcoming with the details as one would like and expect.
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Examining the nature of human conscious experience more fully, Ward 
contends that the hypothesis that a Supreme Mind exists makes sense 
of key features of human experience. To make his case, Ward draws a 
distinction between an inferential hypothesis and an interpretative hypoth-
esis. The former “is one that explains some observed phenomenon by 
postulating an unperceived, or even unperceivable, entity or state” (51). 
An example of such a hypothesis is that the universe began with a “Big 
Bang.” This widely held hypothesis cannot be perceived by humans, but 
is inferred from observations, such as the cosmic microwave background 
and the red shift of expanding star systems. By contrast, an interpretative 
hypothesis “is one that interprets some experienced reality in terms of 
concepts that do not derive simply from the observations in themselves” 
but “introduces concepts that enable perceived data to be interpreted in a 
particular way” (51). An example of this kind of hypothesis can be found 
in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant postulates catego-
ries of thought, such as concepts of causality and substance, as necessary 
conditions for the possibility of human knowledge of objects in the exter-
nal world. Such categories of thought are not derived by first noticing a 
range of sense perceptions and then postulating a hypothesis to explain 
this range of perceptions. Rather, such categories are used as necessary 
preconditions for interpreting perceptions of the world—or so says Kant. 
While one might justly complain that the nature and relevance of the dis-
tinction between these two kinds of hypotheses are not given the care they 
merit, Ward postulates the existence of a Supreme Mind as an interpre-
tative hypothesis. He argues that a Supreme Mind provides a plausible 
interpretative hypothesis that explains the intelligibility of the universe, 
the objectivity of beauty and moral goodness, and the mysterious but per-
sistent sense that a personal presence pervades our world. The argument 
for this conclusion comes quick, various complexities are brushed aside, 
and competing hypotheses are given little attention. Still, for those who 
take on board many of Ward’s assumptions, the argument does come with 
a good measure of intuitive force.
The second part of the book further examines the idea of a Supreme 
Mind as the foundation of the universe. Ward argues that the existence of 
a Supreme Mind naturally explains why the cosmos generates complex 
semantic information of the kind that is found in human minds, and, in 
addition, the Supreme Mind grounds many, if not the full range of, modal 
truths. That the Supreme Mind grounds necessary truths reveals that it 
must exist necessarily, since only a necessary being has the resources for 
explaining why necessary states of affairs are the case. Furthermore, the 
Supreme Mind creates so that it might realize values outside of itself, but 
also so that it might progressively “unfold” its “own nature, as a truly 
creative, dynamic, and relational reality” (137). Here Ward sees a connec-
tion between the Supreme Mind and the God of Christian Scripture who 
is especially identified with self-giving love. Such a God perhaps “has to 
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create some universe of freely creative and interacting minds if God is to 
express the divine nature as love” (135).
Throughout the second section of the book (and elsewhere for that 
matter), Ward speaks of God, or the Supreme Mind, as a kind of “self-
unfolding” Spirit that realizes itself progressively by “expressing” itself in 
and through a developing creation. Unfortunately, it is not clear to what 
Ward’s conception of God amounts, as key concepts are left unexplained. 
The language of a self-unfolding God who is expressed in an evolving 
creation suggests a kind of process panentheistic perspective. However, 
Ward seems equally willing to embrace traditional attributes of God that 
do not normally accompany that perspective, such as incredible power, if 
not omnipotence. In the absence of a clear articulation of what God is en-
visioned to be like, the reader is left to guess about the details of the book’s 
central explanatory hypothesis.
Having presented a philosophical argument for a Creator, Ward, in the 
book’s third section, turns to theological matters found in Christian revela-
tion. The topics treated include the final judgment, the world to come, and 
the interrelation between reason and revelation, among others. Ward pres-
ents a compelling case for the idea that God must hold humans accountable 
for their sins, and so must punish those who refuse to align themselves with 
God’s ways of love. However, a perfectly loving God would be a God who 
is eternally inclined toward forgiveness and reconciliation. Consequently, 
any punishment inflicted by God would be remedial, not vindictive and 
retributive, which makes it possible that universal human salvation will 
eventually transpire in the life hereafter.
Interestingly, Ward’s conception of the life to come differs markedly 
from that which has been popularized by the likes of N. T. Wright and 
J. Richard Middleton. Whereas the latter authors stress a continuity be-
tween this life and the life to come in that God will heal and restore this 
creation, Ward, relying on St. Paul, stresses the otherworldly nature of the 
redeemed state. Without denying the physicality of the heavenly state al-
together, Ward imagines that the new bodies that redeemed humans will 
inherit will be dramatically different than the physical objects we currently 
bump into on a daily basis. One is left with the impression that heaven 
will be a mostly spiritual reality, where the limitations of physicality are 
left behind.
The final chapter of the book is entitled “Reason and Revelation.” There 
Ward offers an experiential and gradualist understanding of revelation. 
Revelation is experiential in that God, the Supreme Mind on which all 
of reality depends, can be encountered through the manifold values had 
by creation and through an awareness that there is a personality, or at 
least some majestic presence, that encompasses the cosmos. And while 
Christians believe that God’s revelation culminates in the person and 
ministry of Jesus Christ (which is not in itself any kind of experience), 
the New Testament writings are based upon unique experiences of God 
in Christ. Revelation is gradualist in the sense that God patiently works 
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with humans to deepen their perceptions and thoughts over time, rather 
than “simply ignoring them or replacing them with miraculous divine 
knowledge” (217). Given this divine way of dealing with creatures, “we 
might expect that there would be a number of different philosophical and 
evaluative viewpoints among early humans and that they would develop 
in differing ways in different cultures and histories” (217). This develop-
mental understanding of revelation thereby enables us to affirm aspects 
of revelation in more than one religion or philosophical system, and it 
explains why Christian Scripture contains images of God that are subopti-
mal and inaccurate and why the Church has failed to recognize important 
moral truths in her history.
Ward is clear that he does not believe that personal idealism, as ex-
pressed in his preferred manner, is taught or entailed by Christian Scrip-
ture. Nevertheless, Ward believes that personal idealism is consistent with 
Scripture and that it renders it natural to expect that God would reveal 
Godself in some form. Ward thus concludes the book by saying that 
“personal idealism provides a sound rational and reflective basis” for the 
Christian faith, and that in this way “reason and faith embrace and enfold 
each other” (221).
As intimated, those looking for penetrating analyses and rigorous de-
fenses of key concepts will be disappointed by Ward’s book. Indeed, one 
of the weakest aspects of The Christian Idea of God is that it is unclear as to 
what, precisely, personal idealism is and how it contrasts with compet-
ing conceptions of God. Nevertheless, the book lays out a comprehensive 
worldview in an engaging, winsome, and concise fashion, and Ward pres-
ents several interlocking reasons to believe it true, or at least reasonable. 
Besides that, the book is sprinkled with creative proposals for integrating 
the deliverances of the natural sciences into Ward’s personal idealism as 
well as insights into how the Christian faith might be placed into dialogue 
with alternative religious outlooks. For such reasons, I recommend the 
book to those who are interested in obtaining a systematic perspective of 
the fundamental structure of reality and its relation to the Christian faith.
